As two Australian siblings squabble over their Play Station’s dual-shock game controller, an East Timorese child runs down a muddy lane pushing an old bicycle wheel with a bamboo stick — contentedly.

As an Australian family argues over which fast-food chain to visit tonight, an East Timorese family gather in a smoky straw hut to consume their evening meal of boiled rice and fish — again.

As a young Australian corporal, based in Dili, monitors daily trends on the New York Stock Exchange, thanks to his unit’s connection to CNN, a young East Timorese boy carries another charred beam from a wrecked government building to help his father build a better roof over their family shack.

Separated by just 600kms of relatively shallow water, the contrasts between Australia and East Timor are more than can be readily understood without experiencing them first hand. East Timor is a small country, yet the internal contrasts are almost as striking as the infinately larger island continent. From the now desolate streets of the once thriving metropolitan Dili, to a village so geographically isolated that it’s inhabitants knew nothing of the Portuguese withdrawal or subsequent invasion by Indonesia until amazed INTERFET forces stumbled upon their isolation more than four months after the international community responded to a cry for help from the beleaguered nation.

Following the announcement of a free vote on independence or autonomy last year, East Timor quickly plunged into a state of anarchy. TNI-backed militias began a campaign of terror to frighten the population away from a long-held desire for independence. The militias were not so much a rag-tag bunch of disparate groups as an organised and co-ordinated sub-army designed to hold the rebel province under some form of Indonesian control. Their strategy was simple in its brutality — terrorise the mostly rural population and instil a fear of much worse to come if they voted for an independent East Timor.

Not only were almost 200,000 reluctant individuals carted away but much of everything of value they owned went with them. Even roofing materials count among ones valuables when one has little else of value in any Western sense. Houses, schools, shops and public buildings were all razed in an initial fury but for the most part, roofs were stripped, furniture and electrical fittings — even bath tubs — were removed from buildings (and eventually the country) before the shell of the building was set to the torch.

The rest of the world did eventually respond, all be it a little belated, to the new country’s plea for help. Led by Australia, 20 nations from all corners of the globe contributed a total of about 11,500 personnel to secure the country, making it safe for the myriad UN and volunteer non-government organisations (NGOs), vital to the rebuilding of a whole new socio-economic structure. And, of course, making it safe for the internally displaced people of East Timor to begin the long journey home.

(As reported in the last ARMY Magazine) the first 30 days of Operation Stabilise saw just a few clashes between INTERFET personnel and the militias as well as POLRI and TNI. The death toll from these lethal clashes was, thankfully, kept in single figures mostly thanks to the discipline and restraint shown by the superior allied force. Yet it was this very willingness and ability to use lethal force that can be credited with keeping the death toll so low. The militias, aware of the consequences of confronting INTERFET simply avoided contact where possible. And, as the INTERFET presence began to dominate more and more ground, there was no way to avoid contact without leaving East Timor all together. So they fled across the border where their presence was, at best, tolerated by the authorities.

As time wore on, the superior training, discipline, and effectiveness of INTERFET eroded the influence, effectiveness, capability and even willingness of the militias to return to make good on their threats. So, with the militias fled and INTERFET in full control, peace was returned to the people and the people returned to their homes — what was left of them.

The ease with which security was achieved did not lull anyone, least of all INTEREFT, into a false sense of security. It was INTERFET’s and Australia’s 3RAR, in fact, that bore the brunt when the Sakunar Militia tried to exert some influence in the Oecussi enclave in mid January after a period of minor, infrequent border incidents. 3RAR stood, as always, ready. During the three days from January 17 to 19, the soldiers of 3RAR were reacted to deal with no less than five cross-border incursions into the enclave. During the first, 15-20 men were observed on the West Timor side moving towards the border near Mahata in A Coy’s area of operations (AO). A half-section patrol dispatched to observe their activity found about 40-50 men on the western side of the border with about 60 East Timorese gathered to confront them on the eastern side. Abuse was exchanged between the two groups until the western group crossed the border. Pipe-guns and Lee Enfield .303s were sighted among this crowd. Two houses were burned and 10 shots fired, wounding four East Timorese. Two A Coy patrols swept down to the incident site after CO 3RAR Lt-Col Peter Singh gave permission to enter the border exclusion zone but the militia withdrew before action could be taken.

A second incident saw B Coy soldiers exchange shots with a group of 20 to 30 militia near Passabe. On this occasion, at least one G3 assault rifle was used by the militia, who fired about 25 rounds when challenged. The Australians returned 16 rounds and the militia withdrew firing as they fled. One militia was reported shot in the thigh and this was later confirmed.

As "contact, wait - out" was transmitted for the third time that afternoon many could be forgiven for thinking that a major offensive was under way. In this third incident, also in B Coy’s AO near Passabe, eight militia with at least two rifles abused and threw stones at East Timorese and an Australian infantry section. They eventually fired two shots at the Australians who immediately returned two shots and one 40mm grenade.

CO 3RAR Lt-Col Peter Singh says he believes the actions over those three days were part of a campaign that had been unfolding for a month and a half. "I would class the militia activities over the months of December and early January as a probing and intelligence-gathering phase," he says. "I believe they have now stepped up their campaign, targeting the locals, to prove to them that they are stronger than INTERFET."

He says that as the militia have stepped up their intensity and frequency of incursions 3RAR have responded likewise. "Our tactics are to observe the militia as soon as they come across the border and then insert our patrols between the militia and the people of Oecussi. In other words, we have to advance on them and intercept them physically. Conducting such tactics requires all our sections to perform to the highest level of discipline and to the highest level of soldierly and infantry skills."

He says the fact that the militia have demonstrated a willingness to open fire had increased the level of hazard on the operation. "But the only time we will fire on them is if our lives or the lives of the locals are directly threatened."

Commander INTERFET Maj-Gen Peter Cosgrove says of the incidents that INTERFET troops are very disciplined and very patient and actually attempt not to kill them all. "That’s the approach — who’s the guy with the weapon? — who’s the guy firing? — that’s who we will try to hit," Maj-Gen Cosgrove says. "It’s quite sad really but in the end we will do what we have to do to ensure that the people of East Timor are safe."